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Antecedents of Audit Quality in MENA Countries:  
The Effect of Firm- and Country-Level Governance Quality 
 
This paper investigates the effect of firm- and country-level governance quality on audit quality, as 
measured by (i) auditor choice and (ii) audit fees. Our findings are three-fold. First, our evidence 
suggests that board independence is positively related to engaging a Big 4 auditor, while family 
shareholdings show a negative association with hiring a Big 4 auditor. Second, board size, board 
independence, and director shareholdings are positively related to audit fees, while government 
shareholdings and family shareholdings show a negative relationship with audit fees. Third, higher 
country-level governance quality is positively associated with hiring a Big 4 auditor and paying 
higher audit fees. Overall, we provide evidence that external audit quality in Middle Eastern and 
North African (MENA) countries is affected by firm- and country-level governance quality, which 
suggests that governance quality and external audit quality seem to be complements in protecting 
stakeholders interests through securing higher audit quality. Our results are robust to controlling for 
alternative measures and endogeneities. 
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The main aim of this study is to examine the under-researched relationship between 
governance structures, both at the firm- and country-levels, and audit quality, as measured by auditor 
choice and audit fees in the context of emerging markets. In particular, our focus is on Middle Eastern 
and North African (MENA) countries that provide a rich ground to link governance mechanisms and 
audit quality.1     
There is an increased interest in the quality of governance, particularly the role of good 
governance in enhancing the quality of corporate financial reporting (Chau & Leung 2006; ; Elmagrhi 
et al. 2016; Elghuweel et al. 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). Auditing is an important part of enhancing 
the quality of financial reporting in that the audit process also seeks to provide independent 
verification of the financial statement prepared by management (O’Sullivan, 2000; Khalil & Ozkan, 
2016; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018). In this case, financial scandals in the 1990s/2000s sharply brought 
the issue of quality and reliability of audited information to the fore (O’Sullivan, 2000; Asthana et 
al., 2010; Habbash & Alghamdi, 2017). Indeed, most of the existing governance codes aim to keep 
external auditors independent from corporate management (Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; Khlif & 
Samaha, 2014). Therefore, an independent auditing process is seen as a governance device through 
which shareholders can monitor management, and by extension, the corporate financial reporting 
process (Fan & Wong, 2005; Lin & Liu, 2009, 2010; Cascino et al., 2010; Barroso et al., 2018).  
Furthermore, the importance of financial reporting quality in developing countries, and 
particularly in the MENA region, is arguably more obvious than in developed countries because 
financial reports are the main reliable source of public information available to investors compared 
to media releases, news conferences, and financial analysts’ updates that are easily and frequently 
available in most developed countries (Afify, 2009; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Baatwah et al., 2015). Therefore, 
high quality audited reports have the capacity to enhance decision making and reduce information 
asymmetry in these markets (Afify, 2009; Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018). 
Further, this study is motivated by the recent increasing interest from academics, practitioners, 
policymakers, and regulators in the audit market in MENA countries in particular. A major reason 
for this is that the audit market plays an important role in preserving transparency and improving the 
functioning of the capital markets (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983; Naser & Hassan, 2016). Accordingly, 
regulatory authorities have enacted a stream of reforms, such as issuing laws, regulations, and national 
governance codes that are aimed at enhancing the quality of audit in these countries, and thereby 




On the other hand, it can be argued that firm- and county-level governance quality may also 
affect a firm’s audit quality (Hay et al., 2008; Lin & Liu, 2009; Asthana et al. 2010; Johansen & 
Pettersson, 2013; Zahra, 2014). However, there is limited evidence within the extant literature on the 
impact of firm- and country-level governance quality on audit quality (see Zahra, 2014). This, 
therefore, provides interesting opportunities to contribute to the audit and governance literature by 
providing new evidence within the context of emerging markets (O’Sullivan, 2000; O’Sullivan & 
Diacon, 2002; Fan & Wong, 2005; Gul et al, 2013). 
Country-level governance systems are maintained, guarded, and enforced by institutions, such 
as the legal system and legislative processes (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; 
Baldini et al., 2018). Through regulations, country-level governance structures may also determine 
and shape firm-level governance mechanisms (Zahra, 2014) and their legitimacy (Judge et al., 2008). 
One reason is that in some emerging economies, governments may play a visible role in shaping 
country-level governance structures through legislation and direct ownership (partial or full), as well 
as regulating and monitoring the markets (Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; Zahra, 2014). However, the 
relationship between these systems and country-level governance structures has been argued to be 
dynamic (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Zahra, 2014; Barroso et al., 2018). As such, deficiencies in firm-
level governance quality can induce changes in country-level governance quality; the opposite may 
also be applicable. 
However, it is noticeable that most empirical studies on audit quality have focused mainly on 
the client’s characteristics (e.g., size, complexity, and risk) (Simunic, 1980; Gul et al., 2013), and the 
client-auditor relationship (e.g., auditor tenure and the type of non-audit services) (O’Sullivan & 
Diacon, 2002; Klumpes et al., 2016) to explain variations in audit quality. In response to calls for 
empirical testing of the relationship between governance and audit quality (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Ben-
Hassoun et al., 2018), this study seeks to investigate the impact of various firm- and country-level 
governance mechanisms on audit quality. Similarly, most of the existing studies on audit quality have 
been conducted in developed countries (e.g., the US and UK), where the audit market and governance 
environment are not identical to those in the MENA region and thus, are expected to affect audit 
quality differently (Chan et al., 1993; Carcello et al., 2002; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Gul et al, 2013; Ben-
Hassoun et al., 2018). For example, Barroso et al. (2018) examine how two prominent corporate 
governance models, namely the shareholder and stakeholder models tend to have different effects on 
the relationship between block ownership and audit fees in 19 countries, but did not include any 
developing or MENA countries in their sample. In particular, the MENA context has distinctive 




importance is usually attached to informal relationships, such as family loyalty, norms, and tribalism 
than formal governance and accountability mechanisms, like corporate boards (Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2007; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). The MENA corporate setting is further characterised by concentrated 
shareholding structures, especially by government and families, and low levels of institutional 
shareholdings, resulting in weak ability of shareholders to enforce managerial accountability, 
responsibility, and control (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Piesse et al., 2012; Khalil & Ozkan, 2016). 
Arguably, these factors may have an effect on the incentive to pursue high-quality audits. Meanwhile, 
the extant literature suggests that contextual factors tend to determine the degree of audit effort, and 
hence, audit quality (Barroso et al., 2018). Accordingly, these contextual challenges raise serious 
empirical questions as to whether voluntary compliance with governance codes that are prevalent in 
MENA economies, on their own, can help improve audit quality in their listed corporations (Al-Ajmi, 
2009; Al-Bassam et al., 2018).  
Consequently, this study seeks to examine the extent to which firm- and country-level 
governance quality and characteristics influence audit quality, where evidence is rare, and thereby 
making a number of new contributions to the extant auditing and governance literature. First, the 
paper contributes to the literature by offering new evidence on the extent to which board 
characteristics (e.g., board size, board independence, and board leadership structure) influence audit 
quality. Second, we provide new evidence on the effect of shareholding structure (e.g., government, 
director, and family shareholdings) on audit quality. Finally, we offer evidence on the extent to which 
country-level governance quality drives audit quality. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
major study to test the potential relationship between firm- and country-level governance quality, on 
the one hand, and audit quality, on the other hand within the MENA context. In this case, our study 
responds directly to Zahra’s (2014) and Barroso et al.’s (2018) specific calls for researchers to further 
examine whether country-level governance structures (country’s legal system and legislative 
processes) are complements or substitutes to firm-level governance mechanisms in protecting 
stakeholders interests through securing higher audit quality. In this case, our study provides a multi-
country evidence on the effect of firm- and country-level governance quality and characteristics on 
audit quality, as measured by auditor choice and audit fees. Therefore, our study is distinct from past 
MENA studies that have investigated audit quality in that they are either exclusively single country-
focused (e.g., Afify, 2009; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Baatwah et al., 2015; El-Dyasty, 2017) or concentrate on 
only one proxy of audit quality (audit report lag or Big 4 auditor) (e.g., Afify, 2009, Al-Ajmi, 2009; 




The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents issues relating to audit 
quality and audit profession in the MENA region. The following sections review the literature and 
formulate hypotheses, present the research design, and discuss the empirical results and sensitivity 
tests, whilst the final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Audit Quality and Audit Profession in the MENA Region: Background and Institutional 
Framework 
MENA countries, like other developing countries, share common cultural characteristics, such 
as a strong hierarchical social structure, greater importance of personal relationships, religion, 
accountability, and trust, and developmental status of socio-economic institutions (Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2007; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Habbash & Alghamdi, 2017). Similarly, the stock markets in the MENA region 
along with the auditing environment have some distinct features that are different from those of most 
developed countries. For instance and generally, there is concentrated shareholding structure often 
dominated by the state and powerful families, especially royal families (Wahdan et al., 2005; Al-
Ajmi, 2009; Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; Mohamed & Habib, 2013; Habbash & Alghamdi, 2017; Ben-
Hassoun et al., 2018). External auditing mitigates agency problems by verifying the quality of the 
financial statements, which reduces information asymmetry and thereby ensuring that the interests of 
other external shareholders are protected (Francis & Wang, 2008; Desender et al., 2013; Barroso et 
al., 2018).  
In addition, the accounting and auditing professions are often directly regulated by central 
governments, and litigation risk is low in the context of a relatively less efficient capital markets 
operating in the MENA region (Wahdan et al., 2005; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; 
Khalifa, 2012; Mohamed & Habib, 2013; Barroso et al., 2018; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018).  In 
particular, the state and powerful royal families in most MENA countries can influence the 
recruitment and appointment of members of staff in most professions, including audit firms (Wahdan 
et al., 2005; Mohamed & Habib, 2013). The political and legal structures and social values (such as, 
religion, hierarchical social structure, importance of kinship, norms, and ethics) may also impact the 
audit profession and consequently the quality of audit services provided (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007). 
These factors tend to impact negatively on auditor independence and therefore can affect the capacity 
of auditors to conduct high-quality audits (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Barroso et al., 2018). Some of 
these countries also have laws requiring audit firms to hire a certain percentage of nationals. The 
Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA), for example, requires all audit firms 




quality of the audit service provided in these countries by limiting the pool of talents that audit firms 
can recruit from (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007).  
Apart from the above, there are a number of factors that may negatively affect audit quality 
in most MENA countries. First, there is often no effective code of professional ethics governing the 
work and practices of accountants and auditors (Wahdan et al., 2005; Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; 
Mohamed & Habib, 2013). Second, powerful professional organisations responsible for developing 
the audit profession are often absent (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Samaha & Hegazy, 2010). Third, there are few 
opportunities for new audit firms and auditors to enter the MENA markets, and thereby further 
limiting auditor independence and audit quality (Mohamed & Habib, 2013; Habbash & Alghamdi, 
2017). Fourth, there is no independent regulatory body to reinforce the independence of auditors and 
to improve the governance and regulation of the auditing profession (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Barroso et al., 
2018). Finally, the number of listed companies tends to be very small in which auditors are prohibited 
from providing many types of non-audit services or having a long-term client relationship. 
Consequently, there is very intense competition among audit firms within the audit market (El-
Dyasty, 2017; Barroso et al., 2018). This may induce auditors to attract and retain clients by providing 
a fee-cutting strategy or be compliant with whims and caprices of management, and thereby impacting 
negatively on audit quality (Barroso et al., 2018).  
Despite the underdevelopment of the audit profession and audit market in the MENA region, 
most MENA countries have experienced a rapid shift in economic development following the oil 
boom of the 1970s, and this has increased the demand for high-quality audit service (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2007; Ajmi, 2009; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018). In particular, there is a strong presence of 
multinational firms and international financial institutions along with a gradual shift of ownership 
rights from the state to private and institutional investors, which require better protection of such 
investments through better-quality audit by more reputable auditors (Choi et al., 2008; Al-Ajmi, 
2009; Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; Khalifa, 2012; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018).  
 Moreover, international auditing firm networks working in MENA countries are not only 
familiar with national accounting standards, but also International Standards on Auditing (ISA) 
compared with small- and medium-sized audit firms (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; El-
Dyasty, 2017). This is expected to enhance the quality of information issued by listed companies 
audited by large audit firms with international affiliations with explicit commitment to maintain high 
audit standards set by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) (Samaha 




contracts to large audit firms with international networks to train nationals towards obtaining 
professional accounting qualifications from the US and UK (Al-Ajmi, 2009). 
In the meantime, it should be noted that most MENA countries require listed firms to prepare 
their financial statements in accordance with International Accounting Standards (IFRS/IAS) or 
national accounting standards that have been developed in accordance with the IFRS/IAS (Afify, 
2009; Baatwah et al., 2015). For example, SOCPA is a professional organization established in 1991. 
It operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Commerce to promote the accounting and auditing 
profession. In 2012, SOCPA began its project for transition to International Accounting and Auditing 
Standards, requiring listed firms other than banks and insurance companies to report using IFRS with 
some modifications, which included: adding more disclosure requirements, removing optimal 
treatments and amending the requirements that contradicted Sharia or local laws. Meanwhile, the 
Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority (SAMA) required local banks and insurance companies to report 
using IFRS. SOCPA will require the adoption of the IFRS as issued by the IASB in addition to the 
requirements and disclosures added to some standards by SOCPA, such as the subject of Zakat 
(religious tax) with effect from 2017 for all listed entities, and 2018 for all other publicly accountable 
entities.  
In the Sultanate of Oman, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) supervises the capital market 
and audit firms accredited to audit the financial statements of the companies regulated by the CMA 
among other roles. Article 282 of the Executive Regulation of the Capital Market Law issued in 1998 
states that listed companies shall prepare financial statements in accordance with IFRS. The 2002 
Omani governance code also requires companies to prepare financial statements in accordance with 
IFRS. The Egyptian Ministry of Investment issued Decree No. 110/2015. This decree required listed 
firms to follow the 39 Egyptian Accounting Standards (EAS) to replace the 35 former EAS that had 
been adopted in 2006 by Decree No. 243/2006. The 39 new EAS include many, but not all, of the 
principles in the IFRS. In Jordan, Companies Law No. 22 issued in 1997 by the National Assembly 
(the legislative body) required public and private shareholding companies, general partnerships, 
limited partnerships, limited liability companies, private shareholding companies, and foreign 
companies operating in Jordan to organise their accounts and keep registers and books in accordance 
with recognised International Accounting and Auditing Standards.  
The UAE’s Federal Commercial Companies Law No. 8 issued in 1984 and its amendment, 
law No. 13 issued in 1988, were released by the Ministry of Economy. These two laws require firms 
to keep detailed records and to provide audited financial statements to the ministry and other 




However, they can only recommend companies to follow internationally accepted accounting 
practices. Additionally, the UAE issued Commercial Companies Law No. 2 of 2015. This law 
requires all companies to apply International Accounting Standards and practices when preparing 
their accounts. 
Most governance codes issued in MENA countries also stress the importance of the services 
provided by the external auditor in enhancing the quality and credibility of corporate financial 
statements (Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; Habbash & Alghamdi, 2017). In addition, these codes 
recommend measures that seek to ensure that external auditors are independent from management. 
For example, Jordanian and Omani governance codes suggest that during their annual general 
meeting, shareholders shall appoint the external auditor for one year, to be renewable as appropriate. 
The board of directors, after consulting the audit committee, can also make recommendations for the 
selection, appointment, re-appointment, and terms of the auditor’s engagement. In order to ensure the 
independence of the external auditor, these codes recommend further that the audit engagement 
should not be renewed after four consecutive years. Similarly, the re-election of auditors may not take 
place before a minimum of two years. Further, the external auditor should not provide non-audit 
services that might impair their independence. Indeed, developing accounting and auditing profession 
helps the current fragmented regulatory context of the MENA countries (Khalifa, 2012).2 This is 
because accountancy could become a cornerstone of an improved corporate governance regime in 
these countries (Khalifa, 2012).  
For example, Baatwah et al. (2015) document that, on average, 120 companies are listed on 
the Muscat Securities Market in Oman over the 1988-2013 period. Additionally, on average, 17 
certified auditors/audit firms are competing to provide statutory and non-statutory audit services for 
these companies with the dominance of Big 4 audit firms. While El-Dyasty (2017), in a study that 
covers 232 firms representing 95% of companies listed in Egyptian stock of exchange in 2016, report 
that Big 4 audit firms hold 34.4% of the Egyptian market, private local audit firms control 31% of the 
Egyptian market, while audit firms affiliated with foreign firms (not including Big 4) constitute about 
34%. This suggests that, on average, the MENA audit market is very small and that the competition 
between auditors may be very high (Baatwah et al., 2015; Naser & Hassan, 2016; El-Dyasty, 2017). 
This imbalance between the supply and demand for audit services is expected to impact audit quality 
and its determinants. 
Although the MENA countries’ governments have made great efforts to establish governance 
codes for listed companies in recent years that are largely similar to those in developed countries, the 




objective of this paper is to examine the extent to which firm- and country-level governance quality 
influence audit quality in this unique MENA setting. Therefore, this may help to advance and enhance 
the governance practices and audit quality in the MENA region.  
  
3. Literature Review: Theory, Empirical Studies and Hypotheses Development 
The separation of ownership and management in modern corporations can lead to rational 
managers engaging in opportunistic behaviour by often expropriating owners’ wealth to their own 
benefit if not monitored (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). One way of reducing self-serving behaviour 
among managers is to incur agency costs by instituting governance and internal control mechanisms, 
such as appointing corporate boards, board committees, and auditors (internal and external auditors) 
aimed at monitoring managers (Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Habbash & Alghamdi, 
2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). It should be noted, however, that the separation of ownership and 
management is not the only source of agency conflict. Since various interested parties are associated 
with business organisations, there have been different types of principal-agent relationships (e.g., 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, bondholders and shareholders) (Lin & 
Liu, 2009, 2010).  
In this case, a major way by which agency conflicts can be reduced is for shareholders to 
appoint independent external auditors (Barroso et al., 2018). It has generally been argued that the 
appointment of external auditors can enhance the quality and fairness of financial reports prepared by 
management for shareholders through their ability to detect and report material deviations from 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), such as the IFRS (Habbash & Alghamdi, 2017). 
Consequently, firms need to employ auditors to audit their books with a view to improve the 
credibility of their financial reporting, and thereby mitigating any inherent agency problems (Gul et 
al., 2013; Habbash & Alghamdi, 2017). In this case, shareholders may need to make two critical 
decisions. The first decision relates to the calibre (choice) of the auditor (e.g., Big 4 versus non-Big 
4 audit firm), and the second inherent decision is the cost of the audit. Indeed, evidence exists that 
suggests that audit quality is positively associated with the size and reputation of the auditor (e.g., 
DeAngelo, 1981; Gul et al., 2013; Habbash & Alghamdi, 2017). This means that large and reputable 
auditors (e.g., Big 4 audit firm) may be considered as an additional layer of governance mechanism 
aimed at monitoring a firm’s financial reporting process better compared with their smaller 
counterparts (Fan & Wong, 2005; Lin & Liu, 2009, 2010; El-Dyasty, 2017). Similarly, large 




On the other hand and from agency theoretical perspective, it can be argued that firm-level 
governance mechanisms may also affect a firm’s choice of audit/auditor quality (O’Sullivan, 2000; 
Carcello et al., 2002; Hay et al., 2008; Lin & Liu, 2009; Asthana et al. 2010; Johansen & Pettersson, 
2013; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018). In general, it can be expected that firms adopting sound governance 
mechanisms have a better control over operating activities and management performance (Al-Ajmi, 
2009, Zahra, 2014). Thus, the firm’s management or its controlling shareholders are not totally free 
in the choice of auditor. In contrast, in poorly-governed firms, management or controlling 
shareholders have a better opportunity to influence the auditor-hiring decision towards their own 
interests (Lin & Liu, 2009, 2010).  
From the country-level perspective, country-level governance systems represent the legal 
system and legislative processes that shape public-private collaboration and participation (Judge et 
al., 2008). Through regulations, country-level governance also determines and shapes corporate 
governance (Judge et al., 2008; Zahra, 2014), including audit quality. Judge et al. (2008) argued that 
variations in law and order may affect the extent to which governance practices are legitimate because 
corporations are created by laws, and governance is a mechanism by which laws are enacted and 
enforced. Additionally, firms operating in countries with effective country-level governance that 
strongly protect investor rights, are more likely experience more widespread shareholdings, greater 
separation of shareholding and control, and higher levels of outside (minority) shareholdings (La 
Porta et al., 2000; Jaggi & Low, 2000). Therefore, these firms may experience higher levels of agency 
problems, and thereby demand higher quality audit (employ a Big 4 auditor and pay higher audit fees) 
in order to produce credible financial reports (Francis et al., 2003; Francis & Wang 2008; Gul et al, 
2013). 
Audit quality refers to the ability of an auditor to detect misstatements, and the willingness to 
report misstatements uncovered in an audit process without fear or favour (DeAngelo, 1981; 
Mohamed & Habib, 2013; Knechel, 2016). The auditor’s technical capabilities and competence 
determine his/her ability to discover a breach in the client’s accounting system. However, the 
probability of reporting the misstatements is a function of the auditor’s independence, size, financial 
clout, and reputation (DeAngelo, 1981; Knechel, 2016; Habbash & Alghamdi, 2017). Specifically, 
DeAngelo (1981) argues that the quality of an audit process is a function of the size of the audit firm, 
or its market share. Large audit firms are more likely to provide higher-quality audit in order to sustain 
their reputation and minimize litigation costs (Gul et al, 2013; Eshleman & Guo, 2014; Habbash & 
Alghamdi, 2017). Furthermore, large audit firms usually have better training programmes, and a 




and report irregularities in the financial statements provided by management (Francis & Wang, 2008; 
Eshleman & Guo, 2014). On the other hand, because of the relatively limited industrial knowledge 
and resources available to small audit firms, they are more likely to provide lower-quality audit 
services (Krishnan, 2003). Similarly, higher audit fees may reflect audit quality and auditor 
effort (Chen et al., 2016). Consequently, we conjecture that auditor choice and audit fees may be 
influenced by the quality of firm- and country-level governance structures, which is the central 
rationale underlying the current study. 
Although prior studies examining the effect of governance quality on audit quality are rare, a 
few exist. Therefore and in this section, we draw on the prior theoretical and empirical literature to 
develop specific hypotheses of interest. Specifically, we examine three sets of firm- and country-level 
governance mechanisms, namely: (i) board characteristics, including board size, board independence, 
and board leadership structure; (ii) shareholding structure, including government shareholding, 
director shareholding, and family shareholding; and (iii) country-level governance quality on audit 
quality. 
 
3.1. Corporate boards and audit quality  
3.1.1. Board size and audit quality  
Agency theory suggests that larger boards are more efficient in monitoring and evaluating 
managerial behaviour than smaller boards, which can ensure that they operate in the best interest of 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Lin & Hwang, 2010). This is because 
a large number of members on the board is less likely to be affected by a dominant CEO than are 
smaller boards (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). Furthermore, large boards may include directors with 
variety of knowledge and corporate and financial expertise that can effectively manage the resources, 
such as capital of the firms (Pfeffer, 1973). On the other hand, other scholars have argued that smaller 
boards provide a better controlling and monitoring function than larger boards, because large boards 
face coordination and communication problems that can outweigh the advantages of having more 
members (Jensen, 1993; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018). Carcello et al. (2002) argue that the board of 
directors affect the quality of the audit services performed, either directly or indirectly. First, with 
regard to direct control, the board of directors generally consult with management when appointing 
the external auditor, subject to shareholder ratification at the annual general meeting. Consequently, 
the board is more likely to be involved in reviewing the overall planned audit scope and proposed 
audit fees (Public Oversight Board, 1994; Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999). Second, and with respect 




expectations of corporate boards that demand higher-quality audit (e.g., independent, diligent, and 
expert). By contrast, Carcello et al. (2002) suggest that larger and qualified boards substitute the 
demand for high audit quality in order to improve financial reporting quality, resulting in payment of 
low audit fees. Therefore, it is expected that there will be a significant relationship between board 
size and audit quality. 
Empirically, Asthana et al. (2010) offer evidence, which suggests that board size is positively 
associated with quick disassociation from auditors with a bad reputation. Similarly, Lin and Liu 
(2009) report empirical evidence based on a sample of Chinese firms, which indicates that firms with 
stronger internal governance mechanisms, as measured by a large number of supervisory board (SB) 
members, are more likely to hire higher-quality auditor in order to enhance the monitoring role of the 
board. Further, the findings of Abdul Hamid and Abdullah (2012) indicate a positive link between 
board size and audit fees for Malaysian government-linked companies. Recently, using a sample of 
newly privatized firms in the MENA region, Ben-Hassoun et al. (2018) find that board size is 
positively related to appointing Big 4 auditor. However, there are differences among MENA 
governance codes about the appropriate size of a board. The Egyptian governance code, for example, 
suggests that it should not be less than five members if they are to be effective. The Saudi governance 
code recommends a board size between 3 and 11 members, whilst the Jordanian governance code 
recommends it to be between 3 and 13.3 Consequently, our first hypothesis to be tested is: 
H1: Audit quality is significantly associated with board size. 
 
3.1.2. Board independence and audit quality   
  Independent directors tend to or are perceived to be more likely to act in the best interests of 
shareholders than traditional full-time utility maximising mangers (Carcello et al., 2002; Abdul 
Hamid & Abdullah 2012; Khalil & Ozkan, 2016). Since shareholding and management are separated 
in most modern corporations, managers have an opportunity to manipulate reported financial results 
for opportunistic purposes (e.g., boost their pay motives or future employment prospects) (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). On the other hand, outside directors are motivated to 
work as representatives of shareholders to prevent and detect such opportunistic reporting by 
management (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hay et al., 2008), and this can be achieved by pursuing higher-
quality audit services (Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018). The willingness of independent directors to protect 
shareholder interests is often driven by their motivation to enhance their future reputational capital in 
the labor market as expert monitors by not associating themselves with poor corporate performance 




the appointment of a Big 4 auditor and to pay higher audit fees compared with executive directors 
(Carcello et al., 2002; Ben-Hassoun et al. 2018). Chau and Leung (2006) find a positive association 
between the percentage of independent non-executive directors on the corporate board and audit 
committee formation. 
The empirical results of O’Sullivan (2000), Carcello et al. (2002), Hay et al. (2008), Abdul 
Hamid and Abdullah (2012), and Johansen and Pettersson (2013) support the positive and significant 
relationship between the percentage of non-executives on the board and audit fees. Also, Afify (2009) 
finds evidence from Egypt supports that independent boards have a positive impact on financial 
disclosure quality and more efficient and effective audit, and hence reduce the audit report lag. 
However, using evidence from MENA countries, Ben-Hassoun et al. (2018) find that board 
independence shows a negative relationship with the likelihood of appointing a Big4 auditor. By 
contrast, O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002) find no empirical evidence to support this relationship. 
Regarding MENA governance codes, the Egyptian, Jordanian, Omani, and UAE governance codes 
recommend that corporate boards should be formed by a majority of non-executive directors in order 
to enhance board independence and effective monitoring of executives. Given the above theoretical 
and empirical literature, the second hypothesis is as follows:  
H2: Audit quality is significantly associated with board independence. 
 
3.1.3. Board leadership structure and audit quality  
The board of directors is an effective governance mechanism to ensure that management 
behave in the best interest of shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998; Fan & Wong, 2002). Specifically, 
the board is responsible for executing the decisions taken during shareholders’ meetings, including 
hiring, firing, remunerating, counselling, and monitoring senior managers. However, executive 
directors (including the CEO) may be biased in monitoring and evaluating management. Therefore, 
the separation of CEO and board chairperson positions is essential if the board is to effectively meet 
its internal governance monitoring role (La Porta et al., 1999; Gelb & Zarowin, 2002). The dual 
positioning on both CEO and board chairperson positions at the top (i.e., unitary leadership structure) 
can result in power concentration in a few senior executives, and thereby compromising the 
independence of the board of directors (Jensen, 1993; Tsui et al., 2001). The literature documents 
that CEO role duality is associated with weak governance and aggressive earnings management 
(Hudaib & Cooke, 2005). Although, combining the two roles may provide the CEO with more 
perspectives on the company and encourage him/her to act with determination (Lin & Liu, 2009, 




to effectively monitor the CEO’s actions (Sharma, 2004). Therefore, companies dominated by a 
single CEO/chairperson (i.e., unitary leadership) may be less motivated to seek an intensive audit, 
and consequently may hire non-Big 4 audit firm and/or pay a lower audit fees (O’Sullivan, 2000). In 
contrast, unitary board leadership impairs ability to monitor managerial opportunism. This can lead 
to the need to engage high-quality auditor and therefore, the payment of high audit fees (Tsui et al., 
2001; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018).   
Asthana et al. (2010) document empirical evidence, which suggests that dual leadership 
structure (i.e., separation of the CEO and chairperson roles) is positively associated with quick 
disassociation from auditors with a bad reputation. Lin and Liu (2009) and Ben-Hassoun et al. (2018) 
argue that firms whose board chairperson is independent from the CEO are more likely to select a 
higher-quality auditor to monitor the quality of the financial reporting process and management 
performance. In their later study, Lin and Liu (2010) document empirical results that demonstrate that 
firms in which the CEO and chairperson positions are held by the same person are more likely to 
switch to a smaller auditor rather than to a larger one. Additionally, using evidence from Egypt, Afify 
(2009) finds a positive association between CEO duality and audit report lag as a proxy for audit 
quality. On the other hand, Tsui et al. (2001), found that separating the two positions provides an 
effective monitoring mechanism that substitutes for high audit quality, and therefore results in the 
payment of low audit fees. However, the results of O’Sullivan (2000) suggest no relationship between 
CEO/chairperson role duality and audit fees. The Egyptian, Omani, Saudi, and UAE governance 
codes recommend separation of the chairperson and CEO roles in order to ensure that boards are 
capable of performing their monitoring role effectively. Given the above theoretical and empirical 
literature, the third hypothesis to be tested is: 
H3: Audit quality is significantly associated with board leadership structure. 
 
3.2. Shareholding structure and audit quality  
3.2.1. Government shareholding and audit quality  
  Corporations with higher government shareholding may seek to win government support by 
providing more transparent and trustworthy financial statements (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). The 
winning of government support can be translated into legitimisation of corporate operations (Aguilera 
et al., 2007) and greater opportunity to acquire essential resources, such as subsidies, tax exemptions, 
and contracts (Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018), and thereby improving performance. Additionally, 
corporations with higher government shareholding face more agency conflict between government 




provide more informative financial statements (Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Al-Bassam et al., 2018; 
Barroso et al., 2018). However, government agencies can exercise a substantial influence over 
government-controlled firms (mainly through additional board members), and can readily have access 
to the firm’s private information (Chan et al., 2006; Barroso et al., 2018). Accordingly, they tend to 
focus more on direct monitoring (Desender et al., 2013). Therefore, firms with high government 
shareholding have less incentive to provide highly credible financial reports to monitor management 
and reduce information asymmetries, and thus are less likely to choose high-quality audit firms, and 
thereby preferring to pay lower fees (Lin & Liu, 2010; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018; Barroso et al., 
2018). Likewise, some studies argue that higher levels of state shareholding, with wide and powerful 
political connections, provide protection against review and discipline by regulatory authorities (e.g., 
Hou & Moore, 2010). Consequently, firms with high government shareholding are less likely willing 
to be extensively monitored by high-quality audit/auditors.  
The ownership of most listed companies in MENA countries remains concentrated and is 
typically state ownership, which brings a unique set of governance challenges (Ben-Hassoun et al., 
2018). Government shareholding probably has important vested interests that often hinder 
governance efficiency at the company level (Khlif et al., 2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016). For example, 
Al-Janadi et al., (2016) found that state-ownership is negatively associated with financial reporting 
quality in Saudi Arabia. 
Nevertheless, there is a general dearth of studies that examine the association between 
government shareholding and audit quality, and therefore a genuine opportunity to contribute to the 
audit and governance literature by providing new evidence. Ben-Hassoun et al. (2018) report that 
government ownership has negative correlation with the likelihood of appointing a Big 4 auditor. 
However, Lin and Liu, (2010) find that government shareholding has no effect on auditor switching 
decisions. Also, Niemi (2005) finds insignificant relationship between audit fees and government 
shareholding. Based on these arguments, the fourth hypothesis is as follows:  
 H4: Audit quality is significantly associated with government shareholding. 
 
3.2.2. Director shareholding and audit quality  
It has been argued that managerial or director shareholding reduces agency conflict with 
shareholders by aligning their interests with those of shareholders, and thereby increasing firm value 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Khalil & Ozkan, 2016). Boards have the power to make or at least approve 
all important company decisions, and therefore it is probable that board members with appropriate 




corporate decisions (Khalil & Ozkan, 2016). In this case, an increase in director shareholding can 
reduce the conventional agency problems, and thereby enhance directors’ incentives to provide 
greater levels of corporate disclosures in order to reduce information asymmetry. Effective auditing 
is perceived as a defensive measure against managerial control (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Barroso et 
al., 2018). Thus, financial reporting quality and diligent auditing can lower the cost of capital, and 
therefore greater alignment of interest occurs when management shareholding is increased (Khalil & 
Ozkan, 2016). On the other hand, director shareholding provides an effective monitoring mechanism 
that can substitute for high audit quality, and therefore result in the payment of low audit fees 
(O’Sullivan, 2000). 
 MENA countries are characterised by weak investor protection and less developed capital 
markets (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; Mohamed & Habib, 2013; Ben-Hassoun et al., 
2018), and thus managerial ownership is likely to be perceived as an efficient governance mechanism 
that offset the less developed formal corporate governance systems (Wahba, 2014; Khlif et al., 2015). 
This is because managers are more informed than outsiders, and hence managerial ownership is 
considered as an effective internal governance mechanism that reduces information asymmetries and 
increases financial reporting and audit quality (Khlif et al., 2015; Khalil & Ozkan, 2016).  
O’Sullivan (2000) reports a negative and significant relationship between executives and non-
executives shareholding, and audit fees. Similarly, Barroso et al. (2018) find a negative association 
between audit fees and insiders’ ownership. Further, Niemi (2005) documents that audit hours and 
fees are lower for companies, which majority owned by their management. In the MENA context, 
Wahba (2014) finds a significant negative association between debt and firm performance when 
managerial ownership is concentrated. Based on these arguments, the fifth hypothesis is: 
H5: Audit quality is significantly associated with director shareholding.  
 
3.2.3 Family shareholding and audit quality 
 Firms in MENA countries are dominated by high percentage of family ownership (Wahdan 
et al., 2005; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; Mohamed & Habib, 2013; Habbash & 
Alghamdi, 2017; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018). Thus, separation of ownership and control is not as clear 
as in the more developed countries. This provides MENA countries with a unique institutional setting 
that allows us to examine the possible effect of family shareholding on audit quality. Family 
shareholders usually participate in the management of the firm either directly or indirectly and 
influence most of the management decisions (Chau & Leung 2006; Cascino et al., 2010; Ho & Kang, 




deteriorating monitoring activities, therefore decreasing reliability perceived by financial markets 
(Anderson et al., 2009). Additionally, family shareholders with higher concentrated ownership have 
sufficient control to follow their own objectives without fear of disciplinary actions from other 
minority ownership interests (Chau & Leung, 2006). Thus, they may attempt to maximize their own 
interest by engaging in benefit-transfer that expropriate other stakeholders (; Fan & Wong, 2002; 
Barroso et al., 2018). Ultimately, family shareholders tend to held private information, increasing 
information asymmetry with outsiders (Barroso et al., 2018). These agency conflicts may induce 
managers to hide private information from other outside shareholders that potentially leads to lower 
quality of financial reports (Cascino et al., 2010). Audit quality can be considered as a governance 
and monitoring mechanism which help to improve financial reporting quality especially in high 
agency conflict situations (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Barroso et al., 2018; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018). From the 
audit supply side, audit firms tend to increase the scope of their audit, and hence the audit fees, for 
firms with high agency conflicts because of increased audit risk (inherent and/or control risk) and 
auditor business risk (litigation risk) (Khalil et al., 2008).  
On the other hand, family shareholders tend to have long-term orientation and reputational 
concerns (Khalifa, 2012). They also have less diversified portfolios and hold large blocks of shares, 
thus they have the incentives and means to control managerial opportunism (Barroso et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, they have access to internal/private information because family members participate in 
the management or serve as directors on the board (Chen et al., 2008). Family shareholders with 
private information tend to provide more direct monitoring through appointing additional board 
members (Desender et al., 2013; Ho & Kang, 2013). Therefore, they have lower incentives to demand 
external auditing services/ hiring top-tier auditors to monitor managers since they also bear most of 
the costs (Ho & Kang, 2013; Barroso et al., 2018). Similarly and from the audit firm side, in 
competitive audit markets with low litigation risk, like most MENA countries, audit firms have little 
incentive to include a risk premium associated with high agency conflicts (Barroso et al., 2018). 
Empirically, Barroso et al. (2018)’s findings indicate that auditors are more opportunistic, not 
driven by the shareholders’ needs, in low litigation countries. They also find a negative relationship 
between audit fees and the blockholders’ ownership in family firms in stakeholder model countries. 
Similarly, using a sample of S&P 1500 firms, Ho and Kang (2013) find that family firms demand 
lower audit effort resulting in lower audit fees. They also show that family firms are less likely to hire 
top-tier auditors and that auditors perceive lower audit risk for family firms. Chau and Leung (2006) 
find non-linear association between family shareholding and the existence of audit committee. Their 




with the existence of audit committees. However, at family shareholding of more than 25%, the 
existence of audit committees increases. On the other hand, Cascino et al. (2010)’s results indicate 
that Italian family firms exhibit higher accounting quality compared to nonfamily firms. Given the 
theoretical and empirical literature, the sixth hypothesis is:  
H6: Audit quality is significantly associated with family shareholding. 
 
3.3. Country-Level Governance Quality and Audit Quality  
Governance generally refers to the manner in which authority is exercised, including the 
respect for the institutions organizing the economies and social interactions among people and the 
governing bodies (Al‐Marhubi, 2004; Zahra, 2014). Country specific regulations and systems 
constitute the framework within which companies operate. Consequently, governmental efficiency, 
regulations quality, and empowerment of laws are found to affect company’s activities and outcomes 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Baldini et al., 2018). Judge et al. (2008) argue 
that the legitimacy of governance practices is derived from the degree of law and order in the society, 
the cultural view of competitiveness, and the extent to which corruption is embraced within a nation.  
Countries apply legal rules and regulations in order to maintain shareholders’ interests from 
corporate insiders undertaking activities that would benefit themselves or other stakeholders instead 
of the shareholders (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Thus, in countries with higher-quality governance, 
where laws and regulations protect shareholders’ interests effectively, company management has 
incentives to address the interests of shareholders (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Ioannou & Serafeim, 
2012), that may be achieved through engaging in a better quality audit process (i.e., employ a higher-
quality auditor and pay higher audit fees) (Francis & Wang, 2008; Gul et al., 2013). Mateescu (2015) 
argues that companies operating in countries with higher rule of law, government effectiveness, and 
regulatory quality are more likely to be compliant with national governance codes and disclose more 
information. Also, companies operating in countries with higher levels of corruption are less likely 
to improve corporate disclosure (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Baldini et al., 2018), and audit quality. 
Thus, there may be higher demand for audit services (e.g., Big 4 and audit fees), together with a 
higher litigation risk in countries maintaining high-quality national governance (Barroso et al., 2018). 
On the other hand, other scholars have argued that firms may substitute the poor governance function 
in weak investor protection countries by employing higher-quality auditors (Choi et al., 2008).  
MENA countries are generally characterised by relatively weak investor protection and 
minority rights, weak institutional environments, inefficient judicial system, heavy bureaucracy, 




protection in MENA countries, the management, the board of directors, and the auditors operate in a 
low litigation risk setting (Barroso et al., 2018). However and recently, most of these countries’ 
governments have undertaken large steps towards reforming their economies (e.g., privatisation) 
(Afify, 2009; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018). Additionally, in most of the MENA region, especially the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, governments have sought international capital and have 
very successfully grown the non-oil sectors of the economy. In order to maintain shareholders’ 
interests and increase the confidence of the foreign investors, these countries have allowed the Big 4 
audit firms to import their global quality assurance systems, hiring mainly auditors with foreign 
examined qualifications (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; Khalifa, 2012; El-Dyasty, 2017). 
Additionally, Transparency International Survey indicates that the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
were ranked 25th, 55th, and 94th of 175 countries in the corruption perception index in 2014, and 30th, 
63th, and 111th of 180 countries in 2009, respectively. Therefore, external auditors are expected to 
play key roles in preventing, detecting, and reporting fraud.  
Most previous studies have found a positive effect of national institutional governance factors 
on corporate reporting quality (e.g., Mateescu, 2015; Baldini et al. 2018). Further, Francis et al. 
(2003) demonstrate that countries with strong investor protection legal framework are more likely to 
demand credible accounting (more accrual based and greater transparency) and audit enforcements 
(employing a Big 5 auditor and pay higher audit fees). Choi et al. (2008) find that audit firms charge 
higher fees to firms that are cross-listed in countries with stronger legal regimes. Based on these 
arguments, the final hypothesis is:  
H7: Audit quality is significantly associated with country-level governance quality  
 
4. Research Design  
4.1. Sample selection and data sources      
Our sample is based on 494 non-financial and non-utility corporations listed on the national 
stock exchanges of Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and UAE (143, 121, 71, 112, and 47, 
respectively), with data over the 2009-2014 period. As traditional content analysis consumes a 
considerable amount of time and effort, we were able to collect data on 600 firm-year observations 
from 100 corporations employing the widely used stratified sampling technique based on firm size 
and industry in each country (Barako et al., 2006).4 Following past studies (e.g., O’Sullivan, 2000; 
Carcello et al., 2002), financial and utility firms are excluded from this study because their operations, 
regulations, and governance structures are quite different from other types of firms (Lin & Liu, 2009, 




It is worth noting that the selected firms in our sample have provided us with the maximum number 
of observations for our main variables of interest (audit firm size, audit fees, and firm- and country-
level governance mechanisms) and to be consistent among our sampled countries, we have selected 
similar number of firms (20 listed firms) in each of the five countries investigated. 
The sampling period starts in 2009, because the 2007/2008 financial crisis increased debate 
surrounding the effectiveness of governance and disclosure practices (Elmagrhi et al., 2016). It ends 
in 2014 because this was the latest year for which the annual reports of listed corporations were 
published at the start of data collection. This design helps to obtain a balanced panel data analysis 
with the advantages of increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing the likelihood of 
multicollinearity among the examined variables (Wooldridge, 2010). This design also provides us 
with the opportunity to compare the current findings with the results of previous studies (Lin & Liu, 
2009, 2010; Johansen & Pettersson, 2013).  
In order to examine the impact of firm- and country-level governance on audit quality, firm-
level governance variables (i.e., board characteristics and shareholding structure) were hand collected 
from the sampled firms’ annual reports, their websites, and capital markets’ websites. Country-level 
governance data, including: (i) voice and accountability; (ii) political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism; (iii) government effectiveness; (iv) regulatory quality; (v) rule of law; and (vi) 
control of corruption indices were collected from the website of the World Bank. Financial and 
accounting variables were collected from the Datastream database. Not all firms provided data 
relating to audit fees, and therefore, firms that provided audit fees information across the sampled 
countries were selected to form an audit fees sub-sample. A total of 470 firm-year observations were 
obtained and finally used for the audit fee sub-sample analysis.  
 
4.2. Measurement of variables and model specification  
The variables used in testing our hypotheses are classified as follows. First, and following 
previous studies, a dummy variable was employed to divide audit firms in MENA countries into two 
categories: the Big 4 audit firms to proxy for higher-quality auditors and non-Big 4 audit firms to 
proxy for lower-quality ones, is our first dependent variable. Audit firm size has been used effectively 
and commonly as a surrogate for audit quality in many previous studies (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981; Lin 
& Liu, 2009, 2010; Eshleman & Guo, 2014; Habbash & Alghamdi, 2017; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018). 
The constructed model examines whether firms’ auditor choice is associated with their firm- and 
country- level governance quality. Firms will randomly select auditors if the two types of auditors 




country-level governance quality have no impact on the choice of auditors. Otherwise, the assumption 
is that the two groups of auditors offer monitoring services with varied levels of quality, suggesting 
that firm- and country-level governance mechanisms should impact their choice of auditors, based on 
the expected benefits and costs of needed level of audit quality. A natural log of audit fee (LNFE) in 
thousands of US dollars was used to measure audit fees (e.g., O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002; 
O’Sullivan & Diacon, 2002; Choi et al., 2010; Johansen & Pettersson, 2013; Barroso et al., 2018), as 
our second dependent variable.  
We use Big 4 auditor choice (DeAngelo, 1981; Eshleman & Guo, 2014; Khalil & Ozkan, 
2016; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018) and audit fees (Choi et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2016), as proxies for 
audit quality. Unlike their non-Big 4 counterparts, Big 4 audit firms have greater resources, technical 
knowledge, and global reach, allowing them to deal with clients more objectively without fear or 
favour (DeAngelo, 1981; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Choi et al., 2010; Khalil & Ozkan, 2016). In addition, the 
key factors, which can enhance the credibility of an audit report provided by a Big 4 auditor include 
better professional audit expertise, a wider range of skills, higher reputation, greater accounting and 
auditing knowledge, and higher ethical standards than their non-Big 4 counterparts (Al-Ajmi, 2009; 
Choi et al., 2010; Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; Eshleman & Guo, 2014). Therefore, Big 4 auditors 
provide high-quality audit services than small audit firms (Choi et al., 2010; Samaha & Hegazy, 
2010). Generally, in developing countries, but particularly in the MENA region, firms have more 
incentives to engage Big 4 auditors in order to improve firm-level governance structures in order to 
substitute for the relatively weak country-level institutions (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Ben-Hassoun et al., 
2018). Samaha and Hegazy (2010) and Khalifa (2012) argue that the fragmented regulatory context 
of accounting and auditing in the MENA countries has allowed the Big 4 audit firms to import their 
global quality assurance systems into the local MENA context, hiring mainly auditors with foreign 
examined qualifications. Additionally, Big 4 audit firms are perceived by financial statement users 
and scholars in MENA countries to be associated with higher audit quality than their non-Big 4 
counterparts (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018).      
Audit fees are normally determined according to the economic cost of the audit and reputation 
of the auditor (Carcello et al., 2002). These costs vary with the size, complexity, risk, and other 
characteristics of the auditee and auditor (Kalelkar & Khan, 2016; Barroso et al., 2018). Auditors 
seek to minimize total costs by reducing the amount of additional audit work, whilst at the same time, 
attempting to avoid potential reputational damage and future losses arising from litigation (Choi et 
al. 2010; Kalelkar & Khan, 2016). Larger audit investigations require more audit hours and/or use of 




Francis (2004) also argues that large audit fees possibly means that large investment is being made 
in audit quality. Extent literature also shows that audit quality is priced in the market (Choi et al. 
2008, 2010). Consequently, the use of Big 4 auditors and audit fees, have understandably been widely 
perceived as reasonable indicators of monitoring through the provision of high quality audit. 
To test our hypotheses, we categorise our explanatory variables into two sets (firm- and 
country-level governance variables). The first set is firm-level governance variables, including board 
characteristics measuring board size (BRDS), board independence (IND), and unitary board 
leadership (UBL), and corporate shareholdings relating to government shareholding (GOSH), director 
shareholding (DISH) and family shareholding (FLSH).  
Second type of explanatory variables is country-related variables. We operationalise country-
level governance quality by employing country-level data compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2014). There 
are six governance indicators measuring the extent of governance quality at the national level (i.e., 
rule of law, government effectiveness, control of corruption, voice and accountability, political 
stability, and regulatory quality). Because the six governance indicators are strongly correlated, it is 
difficult to claim that they are genuinely measuring different dimensions of governance within each 
country (Al‐Marhubi, 2004). Therefore, we use the six governance indicators separately and 
subsequently, we combine the six indices measured based on percentile rank terms ranging from 0 
(lowest) to 100 (highest) into a composite indicator (National Governance Index (NGI)), using the 
simple averaging of the six national governance indicators in line with previous studies (e.g., Al‐
Marhubi, 2004). 
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002; O’Sullivan & 
Diacon, 2002; Lin & Liu, 2009, 2010; Asthana et al., 2010; Barroso et al., 2018; Ben-Hassoun et al., 
2018), the current study controls for possible omitted variables bias by including a number of control 
variables that have been found to have an effect on auditor choice and audit fees, namely firm size 
(LNTA), busy season (BUSY), quick ratio (QUIK), firm loss (LOS), leverage (LV), growth opportunity 
(SGR), return on assets (ROA), year dummies for the study period 2009–2014 (YDU), and industry 
dummies (IRY).  
[Insert table 1 about here] 
4.3. Models specification 
This study develops a logit regression model to test the impact of firm- and country-level 
governance quality on auditor choice for 600 firm-year observations during the period 2009 to 2014. 













Consistent with previous studies investigating determinants of audit fees, the current study 
also uses OLS regression model to explain the determinants of audit fees (e.g., O’Sullivan, 2000; 
O’Sullivan & Diacon, 2002; Carcello et al., 2002; Fan & Wong, 2005; Barroso et al., 2018). Model 
2 regresses governance and control variables on the log of the audit fee for 470 firm-year 









 Where BIG4 is audit firm size, LNFE is natural log of audit fee, BRDS is board size, IND is 
the percent of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the board, UBL is the unitary board leadership, 
GOSH is government shareholding, DISH is director shareholding, FLSH is family shareholding, NGI 
is national governance index, and CONTROLS refers to a number of control variables, including, 
LNTA is firm size, BUSY is busy season, QUIK is quick ratio, LOS is firm loss, LV is leverage, SGR 
is growth opportunity, ROA is return on assets, YDU is year dummies for the study period 2009–
2014, and IRY is industry dummies. We use time dummies to control for possible variation over time 
in audit quality measures due to unobserved time-related factors. 
 
5. Empirical Results and Discussion  
5.1. Univariate statistics 
  Table 2 summarises the descriptive analysis of the dependent, independent, and control 
variables over the study period. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the two main dependent 
variables. The Big 4 audit firms dominate the audit market in MENA countries as they audit most of 
the sampled firms with the mean of 59% (354/600), supporting the argument that the audit profession 
and audit market of the MENA region is undeveloped (Wahdan et al., 2005; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Samaha 
& Hegazy, 2010; Mohamed & Habib, 2013), and the Big 4 audit firms provide a superior and trustful 
audit service that qualify them to dominate most of the MENA region’s accounting and auditing 
markets (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; El-Dyasty, 2017). Our findings are consistent 
with those of other previous studies, which show that the mean of a Big 4 audit firm in Egypt (Khalil 
& Ozkan, 2016), Oman (Elghuweel et al., 2017), and Saudi Arabia (Al-Bassam et al., 2018) is 59%, 
71%, and 58%, respectively. Furthermore, the average audit fees is US$49.35 thousand and ranges 




$82.31 thousand, confirming that audit fees paid to external auditors have wide variation among firms 
listed in MENA countries.  
Moreover, the descriptive statistics for independent (firm- and country-level governance) and 
control variables are reported in Panels B and C, respectively. Panel B shows wide variation of the 
explanatory variables. BRDS has an average of 8.52 board members and ranges between a minimum 
of four and a maximum of 19. Panel B shows that IND varies between 40% and 100%, with an average 
of 87.43%, indicating that the board of directors in MENA listed firms are more likely to be 
dominated by NEDs. Additionally, 474 (79%) of the firm-year observations investigated reveals that 
listed firms in the MENA region are complying with the recommendations of governance codes 
issued in these countries by having separate board chairperson /CEO roles. These descriptive statistics 
are consistent with those of previous studies in MENA countries (e.g., Afify, 2009; Al-Janadi et al., 
2016; Elghuweel et al. 2017; Al-Bassam et al. 2018). Shareholding structure mechanisms in sample 
firms also show an adequate variation, where GOSH, DISH, and FLSH range from 0%, 0%, and 
1.08% to 98.67%, 98.92%, and 100% with an average of 16.15%, 44.94%, and 49.85%, respectively, 
supporting the findings of previous studies conducted in MENA countries. For example, Al-Janadi et 
al., (2016) find government shareholding in Saudi Arabia listed firms to be 11.19% on average. With 
regard to country-level variable, NGI ranges from 21.87% to 71.03%, with the average (median) of 
49.37% (49.71%) and standard deviation of 13.24%. This shows that there is heterogeneity among 
MENA countries in terms of national governance quality.    
[Insert table 2 about here] 
Table 3 presents the correlation coefficient matrix (including both Pearson’s parametric and 
Spearman’s non-parametric bivariate coefficients) for different dependent, independent, and control 
variables. Using Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients only, BIG4 is positively related, at a 
significant level, to BRDS, IND, GOSH, DISH, NGI, LNTA, BUSY, LV, SGR, and ROA, whereas BIG4 
is significantly and negatively related to UBL, FLSH, and LOS. Likewise, Table 3 shows that LNFE 
is positively related, at the significant level, to BIG4, BRDS, IND, GOSH, NGI, LNTA, BUSY, and 
LV, whereas LNFE is significantly and negatively related to UBL and FLSH. In general, the results 
of the correlation matrix support that auditor choice and audit fees are affected by firm- and country-
level governance measures, that board characteristics (board size, board independence, and separation 
of CEO/chairperson positions), shareholding structure (government shareholding), and country-level 
governance quality have a positive and significant effect on the choice of a Big 4 auditor and audit 
fees. By contrast, family shareholdings have a negative and significant effect.  





5.2. Multivariate regression analyses 
Table 4 reports the empirical results for the two regression models to test the association 
between firm- level governance quality and both of auditor choice and audit fees. Models 1, 2, 3, and 
4 show the logistic regressions of firm-level governance quality (i.e., board characteristics and 
shareholding structure mechanisms) and control variables on auditor choice. With Pseudo R-square 
of 36.40% and a Chi-square 295.93***, the logistic model (Model 3) is statistically significant and 
differentiates the listed firms selecting a Big 4 (high-quality) auditors from those selecting non-Big 4 
auditors. Models 5, 6, 7, and 8 report the cross-sectional OLS regressions of independent and control 
variables on audit fees. With F-value 46.33***, the OLS model (Model 7) is statistically significant 
and can predict 72.29% of the change in audit fees. 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
First, a number of previous studies suggest that board characteristics may affect audit quality 
(O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002; Hay et al., 2008; Lin & Liu, 2009; Asthana et al., 2010; Lin 
& Liu, 2010; Johansen & Pettersson, 2013; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018). Therefore, in order to 
determine whether board characteristics affect auditor choice and audit fees, Eq. 1 and 2 are estimated 
by including the three board characteristics (board size—BRDS, board independence—IND, and 
unitary board leadership—UBL). Models 1 and 3 reveal an insignificant impact of BRDS on BIG4, 
whereas Models 5 and 7 show a positive and significant link between BRDS and LNFE, suggesting 
that H1 is empirically supported. This evidence is consistent with theoretical predictions of agency 
theory, which suggest that larger boards are more able to monitor managers effectively (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Lin & Hwang, 2010). Larger boards with qualified and experienced members may 
require more audit effort, which can increase auditor’s costs and consequently raise audit fees 
(Carcello et al., 2002). With reference to the empirical literature, our results are consistent with the 
findings of the previous studies that have found positive effect of board size on audit quality (e.g., 
Lin & Liu 2009; Asthana et al., 2010; Abdul Hamid & Abdullah, 2012).  
The findings, illustrated in Models 1, 3, 5, and 7, show a positive and significant relationship 
between IND and both of BIG4 and LNFE. This suggests that boards with higher percentage of NEDs 
are more likely to demand an extensive audit service and ultimately hire reputable audit firms (Big 4 
auditor) and pay higher audit fees, which supports H2. Therefore, the findings are consistent with 
agency theory, which argues that independent NEDs aim to protect and enhance their reputational 
capital in the market of directors as expert monitors (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Gilson, 1990), to avoid 




financial reporting problems (Carcello et al., 2002) through not associating themselves with poor 
corporate performance and performing their monitoring role with due care. These findings are 
consistent with a number of previous studies that report positive link between board independence 
and audit quality (e.g., O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002; Hay et al., 2008; Abdul Hamid & 
Abdullah, 2012; Johansen & Pettersson, 2013).   
Models 1, 3, 5, and 7 reveal that UBL does not impact BIG4 and LNFE. Notably, agency 
theory suggests that separation of the roles of chairperson and that of the CEO enhances the 
monitoring role of the board of directors (La Porta et al., 1999; Gelb & Zarowin, 2002). Therefore, 
firms with separate CEO/chairperson roles are more likely to employ a Big 4 auditor and pay higher 
audit fees. Our findings are inconsistent with a number of previous results that have found negative 
impact of unitary board leadership on audit quality (e.g., Lin & Liu, 2009, 2010; Asthana et al. 2010), 
but it is consistent with other past evidence that report insignificant link between unitary board 
leadership and audit quality (e.g., O’Sullivan, 2000; Abdul Hamid & Abdullah, 2012).  
We develop our board governance index (BRDGI) with the available governance variables for 
our sample, following previous studies (e.g., Al-Najjar, 2015; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018). The 
governance variables included in this index are as follows: board size, board independence, and board 
leadership structure. The scale ranges from 0 to 3 (equal weights). If a firm in a year meets all of the 
components of the governance index, then, it is given an index value of 3; and for firms that meet 
none of the criteria, a value of 0 is assigned. The construction of the index is based on the 
recommendations of the governance codes in each of the sampled five countries. For example, 
BRDGI for Saudi firms is equal to three (3) when board size is between 3 and 11, the percentage of 
outsiders is greater than 50%, and the position of CEO is separated from the position of chairperson 
of the board. BRDGI is equal to zero (0) if board size is lower than 3 or greater than 11, the percentage 
of outsiders is lower than 50%, and the CEO is also the chairperson of the board. Model 4 shows a 
significant positive impact of BRDGI on BIG4, whereas Model 8 illustrates insignificant link between 
BRDGI and LNFE. This result is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018) 
that have argued that effective board of directors encourages firms to engage high quality auditor in 
MENA countries.  
Second, a number of previous studies suggest that shareholding can impact audit quality (e.g., 
O’Sullivan, 2000; O’Sullivan & Diacon’s, 2002; Fan & Wong, 2005; Hay et al., 2008; Lin & Liu, 
2009, 2010; Barroso et al., 2018; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018). Therefore, in order to determine whether 
the shareholding affect auditor choice and audit fees, Eq. 1 and 2 are estimated by including the three 




shareholding—FLSH). Models 2, 3, 6, and 7 report findings indicating that GOSH has a negative 
significant impact on LNFE which supports H4. Theoretically, government institutions can exercise 
a substantial influence over government-controlled firms, and they can easily gain access to a firm’s 
information (Chan et al., 2006). Consequently, firms with high government shareholding are less 
likely to provide highly credible financial reports, and thus they are less likely to choose high-quality 
audit firms, and prefer to pay low audit fees (Lin & Liu, 2010). Our findings are consistent with Ben-
Hassoun et al. (2018), who report evidence of a negative correlation between government 
shareholding and audit quality in MENA countries. 
The results reveal a positive and significant relationship between DISH and LNFE, which 
supports H5, while it reports insignificant impact of DISH on BIG4. These findings support the notion 
that in firms with high levels of director shareholding, the agency problem shifts from the manager–
stockholder relationship to conflicts between the controlling owners and minority stockholders 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Fan & Wong, 2002). Therefore, the controlling owners (directors) have an 
incentive to pay high audit fees in order to mitigate agency conflicts between controlling owners and 
the minority shareholders (Fan & Wong, 2005). Our findings are inconsistent with O’Sullivan (2000) 
who reports a negative and significant link between director shareholding and audit fees. Furthermore, 
the results in Models 2, 3, 6, and 7 report empirical evidence suggesting that FLSH has a negative 
and significant impact on both BIG4 and LNFE, which supports H6. These findings indicate that 
family shareholders in MENA countries have access to internal/private information (Chen et al., 
2008). Therefore, they have low incentives to demand external auditing services/hiring top-tier 
auditors to monitor managers since they also bear most of the costs (Barroso et al., 2018). Our results 
are consistent with previous studies that have found negative effect of family shareholding on audit 
quality (e.g., Ho & Kang, 2013; Barroso et al., 2018).  
We develop our shareholding governance index (SHRGI) with the available governance 
variables for our sample, following previous studies (e.g., Al-Najjar, 2015; Ben-Hassoun et al., 2018). 
The governance variables included in this index are as follows: government shareholding, director 
shareholding, and family shareholding. The scale ranges from 0 to 3 (equal weights). If a firm in a 
year meets all of the components of the governance index, then, it is given an index value of 3; and 
for firms that meet none of the criteria, a value of 0 is assigned. As there is no specific indication of 
the recommended views on shareholding governance index details, the average of the shareholding 
variable is taken. SHRGI is equal to three (3) when a firm’s government and family shareholding are 
lower than the overall average in each sampled country, and firm’s director shareholding is greater 




government and family shareholding are greater than the overall average in each sampled country, 
and firm’s director shareholding is lower than the overall average in each sampled country. Model 4 
shows insignificant impact of SHRGI on BIG4, whereas Model 8 illustrates a significant positive link 
between SHRGI and LNFE. This result suggests that effectiveness of shareholding structure 
encourages firms to engage auditors to spend more effort (high audit quality) in MENA countries. 
Third, a number of previous studies suggest that country-level governance quality affects 
different corporate activities (e.g., Jaggi & Low, 2000; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Zahra, 2014; 
Mateescu, 2015; Baldini et al., 2018). Therefore, in order to determine whether national governance 
quality affects auditor choice and audit fees, Eq. 1 and 2 are estimated by including the six national 
governance indicators (i.e., rule of law, government effectiveness, control of corruption, voice and 
accountability, political stability, and regulatory quality) and their average. We have included each 
of the six national governance quality indicators and their overall average in separate modules 
because of the high correlation among them. Generally, the findings reported in Table 5, Models 1 to 
14 indicate that the national governance quality indicators are positively and significantly related to 
BIG4 and LNFE. In our sampled countries (based on un-tabulated numbers), UAE and Oman have 
average national governance quality of 67% and 58%, but average Big 4 usage rate of 75% and 75%, 
and audit fees of $111,860 and $36,883, respectively. In contrast, Egypt has an average national 
governance quality of 29%, but average Big 4 usage rate of 53% and audit fees of $25,543. Our results 
support the argument that country-level governance and audit quality complement each other towards 
mitigating agency conflicts, and thereby facilitating a more credible financial reporting (Judge et al., 
2008; Zahra, 2014). Our results are consistent with Francis et al. (2003) who find a positive link 
between country-level governance quality (i.e., strong investor protection legal framework) and 
auditing enforcement (i.e., hiring a Big 5 auditor and paying higher audit fees).               
Observably (although not the main focus of the study), the control variables also have 
significant relationships with the dependent variables, as expected. With regard to the association 
between control variables and auditor choice and audit fees illustrated in Table 4, Models 1 to 8, the 
study finds mixed results. For example, LNTA, LV, and ROA are positively associated with BIG4. 
Likewise, but with regard to audit fees, BIG4, LNTA, and BUSY are positively associated with LNFE, 
while LV and ROA are negatively linked to LNFE (i.e., payment of low audit fees). In summary, the 
empirical results, in general, suggest that external audit quality in MENA countries are affected by 
firm- and country-level governance quality, which indicates that governance quality and external 
audit quality (i.e., hiring a Big 4 auditor and paying high audit fees) are complements in playing the 





5.3. Additional analysis and sensitivity checks 
 The purpose of this section is to extend our analysis of the impact of firm- and country-level 
governance quality on audit quality in MENA countries and to examine the robustness of the 
regression models and the empirical results of our study. For example, we examine the substitutional 
or complementary effect of firm- and country-level governance quality on audit quality. We re-
estimate Eq. 1 and 2 by including the board governance index (BRDGI), shareholding governance 
index (SHRGI), national governance index (NGI), and interaction terms (BRDGI*NGI) and 
(SHRGI*NGI). The results are reported in Models 1 and 2 of Table 6. The results show that the 
coefficient for SHRGI*NGI is positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the 
shareholding governance quality appears to complement the country-level governance quality in 
engaging high audit quality (LNFE).  
Second, we use alternative proxy to measure audit quality. We employ the audit report lag 
(ARLAG) measured as the number of days between the end of the fiscal year and the audit report date. 
Model 3 of Table 6 indicates that BRDS, UBL, and GOSH have a positive and significant effect on 
ARLAG, while IND has a negative and significant link with ARLAG. These results indicate that board 
size, board independence, board leadership structure, and government ownership determine audit 
quality (ARLAG). These results are mostly in line with prior studies from MENA countries (e.g., 
Afify, 2009). Third, we use audit fees deflated by total assets (AF/TA), following previous studies 
(e.g., Simunic 1980), as alternative proxy to measure audit fees. The results reported in Model 4 of 
Table 6 show that firms with large board size, separate board chairperson/CEO roles, and low family 
shareholdings pay higher audit fees. Fourth, we use alternative proxies to measure the control 
variables. We employ the log of revenues (LNTS) to proxy for firm size, the current ratio (CURRENT) 
to proxy for firm-level risk, the market-to-book value of equity ratio (MTB) to proxy for firm growth 
opportunity, and the return on equity (ROE) to proxy for profitability. Models 5 and 6 of Table 6 
show that our results documented in Models 3 and 7 of Table 4 are mostly insensitive to the use of 
alternative control variables.  
Fifth, a number of previous studies suggest that some of the corporate board characteristics 
(e.g., board size) and shareholding structure mechanisms (e.g., government, director, and family 
shareholding) have non-linear relationship with financial reporting and audit quality (e.g., Chau & 
Leung, 2006; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Barroso et al., 2018). This suggests that the extent of external 
auditing and ultimately the auditor choice and audit fees may have a nonlinear association with board 




of non-linear relationship between BRDS, GOSH, DISH, and FLSH on the one hand, and BIG4 and 
LNFE on the other hand, Models 3 and 7 of Table 4 have been re-estimated by adding the square root 
of BRDS, GOSH, DISH, and FLSH. The findings are reported in Models 7 and 8 of Table 6. The 
results generally indicate that there is a nonlinear relationship between government and director 
shareholding, and auditor choice decision, which suggests that entrenched government shareholding 
and director shareholding have access to private information. Therefore, they have lower incentives 
to demand external auditing services/hiring high-quality auditor to monitor managers (Niemi, 2005; 
Ho & Kang, 2013). 
[Insert table 5 about here] 
Sixth, in line with the suggestions of Lin and Liu (2010), we estimate a lagged governance 
quality–audit quality connection in order to resolve the existence of a potential simultaneous 
relationship between governance quality and audit quality. Eq. 1 and 2 are re-estimated by introducing 
a 1-year lag between governance quality and audit quality. In general, the findings presented in 
Models 1 and 2 of Table 7 support the robustness of the results reported in Models 3 and 7 of Table 
4 on the influence of lagged effect. Seventh, in order to test the sensitivity of our findings to the use 
of a different measure of auditor quality (instead of BIG4), we use another proxy that captures that 
the auditor being a part of an international network and thus arguably subject to greater regulatory 
processes and requirements that are associated with being a part of such a network (Al-Ajmi, 2009; 
Samaha & Hegazy, 2010; El-Dyasty, 2017). This alternative audit firm quality (IAF) is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is audited by audit firm that is part of an international 
network, including Big 4 audit firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, 
and KPMG), 0 otherwise. Generally, the findings presented in Models 3 and 4 of Table 7 are largely 
similar to our results reported in Models 3 and 7 of Table 4. 
The eighth sensitivity test is related to the suggested moderating effect of client size on the 
relationship between firm- and country-level governance quality, and audit quality (Carcello et al., 
2002). Following Carcello et al. (2002), the study sample was split at the median to test Eq. 1 and 2 
within each subset of the data. In general, Models 5 to 8 of Table 7 support that our findings are 
insensitive to differences in firm size. Finally, to consider the economic development in each country, 
we adopted the approach of Chung and Narasimhan (2002) by adjusting the exchange rates in the US 
dollars with the country’s Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) (obtained from the World Bank). Model 9 
in Table 7 shows that board size, board independence, director shareholding, and country-level 




significant negative link with audit fees. This is in line with our previous findings reported in Model 
7 of Table 4. 
[Insert table 6 about here] 
In conclusion, a number of additional tests were conducted to examine the robustness of the 
regression models and the empirical results. Overall, the findings are fairly robust across these 
econometric models and generally consistent with the predictions of agency theory.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
The audit profession in MENA countries is less established when compared to developed 
countries. There is often no effective code of professional ethics governing accountants’ and auditors’ 
work and practice, and no powerful professional organisations responsible for the development of the 
auditing profession. However, MENA countries have recently experienced a rapid shift in economic 
development. In particular, there is a strong presence of multinational firms and international financial 
institutions, requiring better protection of their investments through better-quality audit performed by 
higher reputable auditors. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the impact of firm- and 
country-level governance structures on audit quality, as measured by auditor choice and audit fees in 
5 selected countries within the MENA region.  
  Our results indicate that firm- and country-level governance mechanisms affect audit quality 
in our sample of MENA countries. Specifically, we report that board independence is positively 
related to engaging a Big 4 auditor, while family shareholdings show a negative relationship with 
hiring a Big 4 auditor. In addition, we find that board size, board independence, and director 
shareholdings are positively related to audit fees, while government shareholdings and family 
shareholdings show a negative relationship with audit fees. Finally, country-level governance quality 
is positively associated with hiring a Big 4 audit firm and the payment of higher audit fees. Thus, we 
argue that both firm- and country-level governance structures encourage firms to commit to higher 
standards of audit quality.  
The results of this paper have implications for policy makers and regulators in charge of 
improving the process of issuing/refining governance codes, regulatory system, and legislative 
processes that are often aimed at protecting the interests of different stakeholders by promoting higher 
standards of audit quality. Despite the underdeveloped nature of accounting and auditing profession, 
MENA countries recently adopted and issued corporate governance codes based on international 
corporate governance best practices recommendations. Thus, our results support the positive effect 




governments and regulators in the MENA region and other developing countries to issue/reform 
governance best practices recommendations to protect shareholders’ interests. Also, for managers and 
corporations, our evidence suggests that they may be able to improve their audit quality by hiring 
more independent directors, as well as encouraging directors to increase their shareholdings. 
Finally and like all archival studies of this nature, the current study is subject to a number of 
limitations. First, the sample is limited to 600 firm year observations from five MENA countries. 
Thus, future studies may enhance the insights that they may be able to offer by employing a large 
sample of firms and countries to test these relationships. Second and similar to other archival studies, 
the variables used as proxies for audit quality and governance mechanisms may or may not reflect 
actual practice, and hence, future researchers may offer new insights within the MENA context by 
applying other dimensions of audit quality and governance practices. Third and although this study 
attempted to control for many factors that previous studies have found to affect audit quality, we have 
been unable to include other variables because the required data was not available, such as non-audit 
services and the composition of audit committees. Therefore and as more relevant data becomes 
available, future studies may attempt to extend our findings by controlling for other factors that may 
affect audit quality. Finally, the current study conducts only quantitative analysis in investigating the 
governance antecedents of audit quality in MENA countries. Future studies may offer new insights 
by conducting in-depth qualitative analysis regarding these issues. 
NOTES 
1. The MENA region includes Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the 
United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and the Republic of Yemen 
(http://www.worldbank.org). 
2. In UAE, Khalifa (2012) documented that the state has taken the lead role by regulating in some 
detail the affairs of accounting and auditing professions. However, UAE does not possess an 
accounting institute that organizes the training and examination of accounting trainees or the 
approval of their professional designations. Similarly in Egypt, although the Egyptian Society of 
Accountants and Auditors that was established in 1946 plays a central role in the accounting and 
auditing profession, however, it does not have the authority to license accountants and auditors or 
to establish auditing standards (Samaha & Hegazy, 2010).  
3.  We acknowledge that MENA governance codes recommend both minimum and maximum board 
size, which might be seen as a limitation for predicting the direction of the relationship between 




results for this association. It is worth noting that our robustness tests tried to minimise if not 
eliminate this limitation. 
4. For the purpose of the current study, five countries are selected namely; Egypt, Jordan, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The choice of these specific countries is to satisfy three main criteria. 
First, in order to ensure data availability and sample homogeneity, some filtering rules were applied. 
Accordingly, some countries were excluded from the sample. For example, Bahrain and Qatar were 
dropped because their firms’ capital markets include mostly financial and investment corporations 
(Al-Ajmi, 2009). Countries with non-active stock markets (such as, Iraq and Libya) and did not 
issue governance code (such as, Kuwait) were excluded. Second, the selected countries should 
reflect the diversity in MENA countries in order to support the generalization of the results. 
Specifically, from a capital perspective, whereas Saudi Arabia and the UAE are net capital exporting 
countries, Egypt and Jordan are considered net capital importing countries (Piesse et al., 2012). 
Oman was the first country in the MENA region to issue its national governance code in 2002. The 
final selected five countries account for over 58% of the MENA stock market capitalization in 2014. 
Finally, the selected five countries share a number of common characteristics: (i) they are all have 
similar accounting, auditing, governance, and legal systems which are derived from the Anglo–
Saxon system (Piesse et al., 2012; Al-Bassam et al., 2018; Khalil & Ozkan, 2016); (ii) they require 
listed firms to prepare their financial statements in accordance with international accounting 
standards or national accounting standards that were developed in accordance with the international 
accounting standards (Wahdan, 2005; Samaha & Hegazy, 2010); and (iii) they have similar cultural 
characteristics (e.g., a strong hierarchical social structure, importance of personal relationships, 
religion, accountability, and trust), corporate law, ownership structures (concentrated shareholding 
dominated by the state and powerful families), and the state of audit profession (auditing profession 
is directly regulated by the government) (Piesse et al., 2012; Al-Bassam et al., 2018); thereby 
permitting comparability of governance and audit quality among firms and across countries. 
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Table 1. Summary of variables and measures  
Dependent variables 
BIG4 A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is audited by a big four audit firm 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise.   




Independent/ Firm-level governance variables  
BRDS Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of a company. 
IND The percentage of non-executive directors to the total number of board directors. 
UBL A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO of firm are combined at 
the end of its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
GOSH 
DISH 
Percentage of shares held by government. 
Percentage of shares held by board of directors. 
FLSH Percentage of shares held by family members. 
Independent/ Country-level governance variables 
NGI National Governance Index which is the average of the six indices (i.e., voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption). 
VOICE Voice and accountability: measuring perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media. 
POLTC Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism: measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism.  
GOVT Government effectiveness: measuring perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
REGY Regulatory quality:  measuring perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
RLAW Rule of law: measuring perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
CORN Control of corruption: measuring perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests. 
Control variables 
LNTA Natural log of the total assets in thousands of US dollars of a firm (wc02999). 
BUSY Binary variable =1 if financial year-end is between 31 December and 31 March inclusive;=0 otherwise 
QUIK 
LOS 
Quick Ratio (wc08101) is (Cash & Equivalents + Receivables (Net)) / Current Liabilities-Total.  
Binary variable = 1 if the firm incurred a loss in the previous year, 0 otherwise. 
LV 
SGR 
Percentage of total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc02999) in a financial year  
Percentage of current year’s sales (wc01001) minus previous year’s sales scaled by previous year’s sales. 
ROA  Percentage of operating profit (wc01250) to total assets (wc02999) in a financial year. 
YDU Dummies for the years 2009 to 2014 inclusive. 
IRY  Dummies for each of the eight main industries: basic materials; oil & gas, industrial, customer goods, 














Table 2. Summary of descriptive statistics of all variables for all sampled firms  
 Variables  Mean Median STD Minimum Maximum VIF 
Panel A: Dependent variables  




LNFE ($ 000) 49.35 23.61 82.31 4.06 865.79 - 
Panel B: Independent/ Governance variables  
BRDS 8.52 9 2.59 4 19 1.56 
IND% 87.43 88.89 14.03 40 100 2.09 
UBL% 21 0 40.90 0 100 2.12 
GOSH% 16.15 3.29 24.60 0 98.67 2.12 
DISH% 44.94 47.89 27.90 0 98.92 2.08 
FLSH% 49.85 47.06 28.39 1.08 100 2.28 
NGI % 49.37 49.71 13.24 21.87 71.03 2.33 
Panel C: Firm control variables  
LNTA ($000,000) 2089.75 184.45 5728.52 3.45 35222.66 2.69 
BUSY% 95 100 22.50 0 100 1.54 
QUIK% 139.71 100 132.88 10 967 2.31 
LOS% 16 0 36.40 0 100 1.35 
LV% 20.38 17.99 17.65 0 69.75 2.22 
SGR% 9.06 6.01 45.46 -92.59 594.06 1.29 
ROA% 6.56 6.11 7.76 -32.09 31.03 1.63 




Table 3. Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of all variables  
 BIG4 LNFE BRDS IND UBL GOSH DISH FLSH NGI LNTA BUSY QUIK LOS LV SGR ROA 
BIG4 1 0.468*** 0.150*** 0.339*** -0.296*** 0.350*** 0.154*** -0.299*** 0.151*** 0.482*** 0.178*** 0.040 -0.133*** 0.225*** 0.104** 0.174*** 
LNFE 0.467*** 1 0.146*** 0.314*** -0.337*** 0.365*** 0.025 0.283*** 0.440*** 0.721*** 0.203*** 0.037 -0.071 0.191*** 0.011 -0.050 
BRDS 0.135*** 0.175*** 1 0.011 0.243*** 0.273*** 0.093** -0.035 -0.270*** 0.355*** 0.010 -0.011 -0.083** 0.016 0.099** 0.077* 
IND 0.352*** 0.340*** 0.029 1 -0.448*** 0.226*** 0.107*** -0.271*** 0.431*** 0.128*** 0.083** 0.132*** -0.043 0.026 0.029 0.158*** 
UBL -0.296*** -0.353*** 0.249*** -0.435*** 1 -0.023 0.068* 0.091** -0.434*** -0.196*** -0.240*** -0.155*** -0.021 -0.087** 0.013 -0.012 
GOSH 0.238*** 0.312*** 0.167*** 0.062 -0.027 1 0.206*** -0.440*** 0.049 0.547*** -0.218*** 0.121*** -0.183*** -0.009 0.05 0.137*** 
DISH 0.145*** 0.031 0.107*** 0.022 0.072* 0.273*** 1 -0.607*** -0.124*** 0.125*** -0.202*** -0.064 -0.188*** 0.078* 0.105*** 0.255*** 
FLSH -0.315*** -0.310*** -0.060 -0.223*** 0.095** -0.470*** -0.597*** 1 -0.071* -0.281*** 0.196*** -0.078* 0.129*** -0.011 -0.048 -0.205*** 
NGI 0.150*** 0.403*** -0.271*** 0.390*** -0.468*** 0.033 -0.192*** -0.023 1 0.016 0.141*** 0.296*** -0.081** -0.004 -0.068* 0.065 
LNTA 0.482*** 0.720*** 0.352*** 0.118*** -0.204*** 0.529*** 0.137*** -0.305*** 0.047 1 0.081** -0.062 -0.166*** 0.298*** 0.156*** 0.066 
BUSY 0.178*** 0.205*** -0.016 0.202*** -0.240*** -0.277*** -0.212*** 0.194*** 0.164*** 0.086** 1 0.003 0.102** 0.137*** -0.004 -0.032 
QUIK 0.043 0.046 -0.010 0.148*** -0.157*** 0.138*** -0.066 -0.088** 0.300*** -0.071* -0.030 1 -0.235*** -0.573*** 0.044 0.267*** 
LOS -0.133*** -0.063 -0.102** -0.005 -0.021 -0.164*** -0.190*** 0.129*** -0.076* -0.146*** 0.102** -0.239*** 1 0.096** -0.089** -0.475*** 
LV 0.212*** 0.144*** 0.026 0.038 -0.080** -0.053 0.063 -0.017 -0.014 0.329*** 0.137*** -0.530*** 0.132*** 1 0.036 -0.169*** 
SGR 0.110*** 0.019 0.094** 0.032 0.012 0.029 0.113*** -0.074* -0.073* 0.172*** -0.012 0.031 -0.076* 0.047 1 0.290*** 
ROA 0.158*** -0.037 0.086** 0.094** 0.001 0.046 0.233*** -0.197*** 0.044 0.053 -0.015 0.246*** -0.442*** -0.209*** 0.274*** 1 
See Table 1 for variables’ definitions. 
The bottom half of the table contains Person’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. ***, **, and * 









Table 4. Firm-level antecedents of audit quality 
 BIG4 BIG4 BIG4 BIG4 LNFE LNFE LNFE LNFE 




























BRDGI - - - 3.294*** 
(0.000) 
- - - 0.262 
(0.150) 



























SHRGI -  - 0.010 
(0.979) 
- - - 0.401*** 
(0.000) 
Control variables        
































































































































YDU  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
IRY Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant  -12.417*** -7.726*** -11.222*** -11.147*** 4.025*** 5.042*** 3.963*** 4.810*** 
F-value - - - - 49.07*** 49.48*** 46.33*** 51.50*** 
Chi-square 288.21*** 272.52*** 295.93*** 273.45*** - - - - 
Adjusted R2 - - - - 71.10% 71.27% 72.29% 71.24% 
Pseudo R2   35.45% 33.52% 36.40% 33.64% - - - - 
No. of obs. 600 600 600 600 470 470 470 470 
Variables’ definitions: Board governance index (BRDGI), shareholding governance index (SHRGI). See Table 1 for 
variables’ definitions.  
Ordinary least squares coefficients, logit regression coefficients and two-tailed p-values are shown. ***, **, and * denote 


















Table 5. Country-level antecedents of audit quality 
 BIG4 BIG4 BIG4 BIG4 BIG4 BIG4 BIG4 LNFE LNFE LNFE LNFE LNFE LNFE LNFE 
(Model) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
VOICE 0.670 
(0.645) 
- - - - - - 3.937*** 
(0.000) 
- - - - - - 
POLTC - 1.806*** 
(0.000) 
- - - - - - 1.182*** 
(0.000) 
- - - - - 
GOVT - - 1.165* 
0.083 
- - - - - - 1.792*** 
(0.000) 
- - - - 
REGY - - - 1.774** 
(0.044) 
- - - - - - 2.094*** 
(0.000) 
- - - 
RLAW - - - - 1.430 
(0.176) 
- - - - - - 2.503*** 
(0.000) 
- - 
CORN - - - - - 0.913 
(0.208) 
- - - - - - 2.023*** 
(0.000) 
- 
NGI - - - - - - 2.065** 
(0.020) 
- - - - - - 2.379*** 
(0.000) 
Control variables              




































































































































































































YDU  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
IRY Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant  -8.831*** -8.598*** -8.891*** -9.359*** -9.406*** -8.867*** -9.276*** 4.597*** 5.805*** 5.461*** 4.817*** 4.278*** 5.271*** 5.111*** 
F-value - - - - - - - 39.00*** 47.61*** 52.94*** 49.08*** 48.74*** 55.34*** 53.08*** 
Chi-square 250.03*** 263.66*** 252.86*** 253.94*** 251.67*** 251.41*** 255.31*** - - - - - - - 
Adjusted R2 - - - - - - - 62.99% 67.61% 69.93% 68.28% 68.13 70.87% 69.99% 
Pseudo R2   30.76% 32.43% 31.10% 31.24% 30.96% 30.93% 31.40% - - - - - - - 
No. of obs. 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 
See Table 1 for variables’ definitions. 




Table 6. Sensitivity analyses (PART1) 
  Interaction variables Audit report lag AF/TA Alternative control  variables Linearity 
 Big4  LNFE ARLAG  Big4  LNFE Big4 LNFE 
Ind. var./ Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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Control variables       


































































































































YDU  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
IRY Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant  -11.956** 4.881*** 3.895*** 2.938*** -12.451*** 4.484*** -10.011*** 4.502*** 
F-value - 47.84*** 6.06 6.15 - 35.20*** - 47.33*** 
Chi-square 275.32*** - - - 330.22*** - 312.17*** - 
Adjusted R2 - 71.40% 18.58 22.85 - 66.31% - 72.73% 
Pseudo R2   33.87% - - - 40.62% - 38.40% - 
No. of observations 600 470 600 470 600 470 600 470 
Variables’ definitions: Audit report lag (ARLAG), Audit fees divided by total assets (AF/TA), board size squared 
(BRDS2), government shareholding squared (GOSH2), director shareholding squared (DISH2), family shareholding 
squared (FLSH2), log of revenues (LNTS), current ratio (CURRENT), market to book value (MTB), and return on 
equity (ROE). See Table 1 for other variables’ definitions. 
Ordinary least squares coefficients, logit regression coefficients and two-tailed p-values are shown. ***, **, and * 






Table 7. Sensitivity analyses (PART2) 
 
 Lagged  Alternative Auditor size Small size firms  Large size firms  PPP 
 Big4  LNFE IAF  LNFE Big4  LNFE Big4  LNFE LNFE-P 












































































































































IAF    0.392*** 
(0.000) 




























































































































YDU  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
IRY Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant  -10.886*** 2.941*** -4.403** 3.542*** -6.878*** 3.910*** -22.007*** 2.618*** 4.841*** 
F-value - 42.63*** - 49.52*** - 10.81*** - 18.82*** 171.54*** 
Chi-square 253.69*** - 124.75*** - 92.32*** - 157.51*** - - 
Adjusted R2 - 73.41% - 73.64% - 52.14% - 67.28% 91.34% 
Pseudo R2   37.52% - 22.54 - 22.96% - 50.23% - - 
No. of observations 600 470 600 470 300 235 300 235 470 
 
Variables’ definitions: International audit firm network (IAF), Natural log of audit fees in thousands of dollars adjusted 
by Purchasing Power Parity (LNFE-P), Natural log of the total assets in thousands of dollars adjusted by Purchasing 
Power Parity (LNTA-P). See Table 1 for other variables’ definitions. 
Ordinary least squares coefficients, logit regression coefficients and two-tailed p-values are shown. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
